Increasingly, central governments approach contentious natural resource allocation problems by devolving partial decision-making responsibility to local stakeholders. This paper conceptualizes devolution as a three-stage process and uses a simulation model calibrated to real-world conditions to analyze devolution in Spain's Upper Guadiana Basin. The Spanish national government has proposed spending over a billion euros to reverse a 30 year decline in groundwater levels. We investigate how the government can most eectively allocate this money to improve water levels by utilizing its power to set the structure of a local negotiation process. Using a numerical Nash model of local bargaining, we nd that if the national government creates appropriate incentives, local bargaining can produce water stabilization. The actual water levels that will emerge are highly dependent on the central government's decisions about the budget available to local stakeholders and the default policy, which. will be inuenced by the relative value the government places on various nancial and environmental outcomes. Our paper concludes by determining the relationship between these relative valuations and the government's preferences over water levels. *
Introduction
A common approach to resolving contentious local resource allocation problems is to empower local stakeholders to develop solutions that are specic to the local conditions. This approach is often referred to as devolution.
Devolution appeals to central governments for a variety of reasons, including political philosophy, a belief that local interests better understand the problem details, and a desire to minimize implementation costs by encouraging local buy-in. Oates (1972) observed that the benet or cost of decentralization relative to central control is largely determined by the degree of regional heterogeneity. Our interest in this paper is not whether devolution is an appropriate choice; rather, we note that, for better or worse, many national governments have chosen devolution to address certain issues. Our interest is in how the national government can ensure that the resulting outcomes achieve its goals. Our analysis is thus similar in character to the branch of the decentralization literature that focuses on developing mechanisms by which the central government can induce local governments to respect the national government's goal (see, for example, Levaggi 2002) . Much of this literature focuses on a permanent assignment of responsibility for particular types of decisions to local governments. In contrast, our interest is in the one-time devolution of a particular real-world policy choice.
We conceptualize this type of one-time devolution as a three-stage process. The rst stage is a structure setting stage in which a central gov-2 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics.
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5 ernment sets the structure for local bargaining. For instance, a familiar pattern in US environmental policy is that the national government sets an environmental threshold and threatens federally imposed regulations if individual states fail to meet the threshold. The threatened regulation provides a default outcome against which the state political process operates. It also creates a constraint on the options available at the local level; to avoid the default outcome, the state policy-making process can only consider policies that meet the threshold. The second stage is the local bargaining stage in which local stakeholders select policies within the structure determined in the previous stage. The last stage is the implementation stage, which determines how economic agents react to those policy choices. The rst two stages are political economic problems, while the nal stage is a purely economic problem. This three-stage framework is used to answer three questions. First, how does the outcome of the local bargaining process depend on the decisions made at the national level? Second, given that variation, what structure should the national government set in the rst stage? Finally, what policy outcomes will result given the government's choices?
This paper applies our three-stage devolution framework to a groundwater allocation problem in Spain's Upper Guadiana Basin. Negotiations over groundwater issues have been studied in a variety of contexts. Netanyahu et al. (1998) apply both cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models to groundwater allocation between Israel and Palestine. Just and Netanyahu (1998) investigate the divergence between ideal basin-wide management of multi-national river basins and the real world experience of bi-lateral agreements within these basins. A common theme of these papers is that the potential for free-riding and cheating may reduce the eciency of nal outcomes.
The setting we model diers from these papers in two key respects. First, our model considers a basin that lies entirely within one jurisdiction. We therefore model individual water users rather than aggregated states. As a result, we take free-riding behavior as given; farmers in our model respond optimally ex-post to whatever policies are imposed. Second, a major focus of our paper is the role of the national government in setting the conditions under which local negotiation occurs.
Over the last 30 years, the Upper Guadiana Basin has experienced large declines in groundwater levels. In recent years, the Spanish national government has indicated a willingness to appropriate signicant funds to improve conditions in the Guadiana. It has also explicitly sought to involve local stakeholders in the process, seeking a compromise solution and ceding considerable control over the plan details to local entities. Yet, the local policy process has stalled and failed to produce a viable plan for improving water levels within the region.
1 We believe that this failure stems from the national government's failure to establish explicit consequences for local stakeholders failing to achieve compromise. By failing to do so, the national government 1 In 2008, a plan was adopted. This plan is in the early stages of implementation and it remains to be seen whether it can ultimately be successful in stabilizing or improving water levels. 4 has established an implicit default the continuation of current policies indenitely. If the national government truly wishes to improve water levels, it must use both its budgetary powers and its power to set the default to meet its goals.
Water right enforcement is a central feature of the Guadiana problem.
Although groundwater use in the region is legally allowed only with the possession of water rights, illegal use is rampant. Illegal use is facilitated by both the local political opposition to enforcement and the lack of infrastructure for monitoring water use. As a result, the Guadiana problem must be viewed through the lens of enforcement policy. There is a strong sense that eective enforcement is only feasible if local interests accept the rules regarding water use and that this acceptance is unlikely unless local interests feel that they were part of the plan development. This paper does not investigate whether local input is truly necessary. Instead, it demonstrates one way that the government might induce stakeholders to agree to a stringent enforcement policy.
The approach draws on ideas developed in the voluntary compliance literature (Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Segerson and Wu, 2006) . The basic lesson of this literature is that under certain circumstances, a government can convince rms to voluntarily comply with a goal by threatening an undesirable alternate policy. In the Guadiana setting, it is infeasible to induce voluntary compliance because of free-riding concerns. Instead, we demonstrate that with appropriate incentives, the national government can use the threat of a relatively mild ne policy to induce stakeholders to impose a much more 5 stringent ne policy upon themselves as part of a local compromise solution.
Since it is dicult to precisely identify the national government's goal, we examine a stylized specication of choices facing the national government, focusing on the national government's tradeo between the environment, farm prot, and the burden on taxpayers. We consider various possible levels for the government's willingness to trade between these objectives; for each level, we identify the government's optimal policy choices and the resulting outcomes.
In the next section, we describe the details of the Guadiana problem.
We then develop a stylized model capturing the essential features of the problem. We describe the main results produced by this model and then oer concluding comments.
The Guadiana Basin
The Upper Guadiana Basin lies in the Castilla-La Mancha region of Spain.
The area is heavily agricultural and relies on groundwater for most of its water needs. Over the last 30 years, groundwater has fueled signicant economic growth in the region, but has also caused dramatic declines in water levels within the region. The declines have nearly destroyed the wetlands in Las Tablas de Daimiel national park, along with much of the other remaining wetlands in the region. Moreover, declining water levels have caused many existing wells to dry up. A number of authors and studies have described 6 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics.
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5 the history, economics, and social conditions within the Upper Guadiana (see Rosell (2001) , (Llamas and Martinez-Santos, 2005) ). An approximate relationship between depth and use derived from (Bromley et al., 1996 (Bromley et al., , 2001 suggests that if farmers continued current use indenitely, water levels would fall from 50 m below surface today to 116 m below the surface in 30 years. A series of policy initiatives over the last 20 years have aimed to improve water levels, but have been unsuccessful at generating sustained reductions in use thus far.
There is a substantial literature on the economics of groundwater use.
Economists have long argued that groundwater will be overexploited in the absence of coordinated management, since it is a common property resource.
Early economic work on groundwater focused on determining the socially optimal groundwater extraction path and proposing regulatory instruments capable of achieving this optimum.
2 In 1980, Gisser and Sanchez demonstrated that the benets of groundwater management can be small in practice. Koundouri (2004) Group, made up of farmers themselves, public opposition has thus far been sucient to prevent enforcement.
The result is that addressing the concerns in the Guadiana basin requires both reorganizing and enforcing water rights. Following current discussions in the region, we model the reorganization of water rights through a combined program of purchasing some existing water rights and legalizing a portion of the water use on farms that currently lack any water rights. The key policy variables in the reorganization program are the budget available for acquisition of rights and the share of water use on farms without rights that will be legalized. The key policy variables in the enforcement program are 9 the severity of nes and the funds made available for enforcement activities.
Given the prevalence of illegal use within the region today, it is critical that the two programs be coupled. Without enforcement, the purchase of existing water rights will not necessarily lead to actual reductions in water use;
it may simply transform legal use into illegal use. To reinforce this coupling and to minimize enforcement expenditures, we assume that the government will link participation in either portion of the water right reorganization program with an agreement to install a meter.
Our model structure assumes that responsibility for setting these policies will be divided between the national government and a local negotiation process. We believe that the split described below is indicative of both political realities in the region and the decisions the national government appears willing to cede to stakeholders in the region. At the same time, we do not intend to imply that the national government is necessarily constrained by the split. If it had the political will to do so over the strenuous objections of citizens within the region, there is nothing that explicitly prevents the national government from directly setting all the policies. In the next section,
we develop a stylized model of all three layers of decision making. Our model is designed to capture the key components of the debate at a high level. We thus focus exclusively on water use, abstracting away from quality issues. Our model includes four policy instruments, denoted by vector g: the severity of nes for illegal water use (φ), the budget for monitoring water use (B M ), the budget for purchasing water rights from farmers (B A ) and the partial legalization of water rights on farms that currently lack any rights (λ). Responsibility for setting these instruments is divided between the national government and a local stakeholder negotiation process. Moreover, our model implicitly includes two policy vectors: one g 0 is imposed if the stakeholders fail to reach agreement and the other g N is the outcome of the bargaining process. In the structure setting stage, the national government makes decisions about how much to spend on enforcement and acquisition,
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This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5 
Policies selected during the rst two stages
Annualized budget for enforcing water rights
Annualized budget for acquiring water rights φ Fine coecient describin severity of penalties λ Legalized share of use on farms with no rights today
Policies selected during the structure-settting stage Legalized share (λ) set during local bargaining
Choices made by farm i This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5
as well as the severity of its threat to the local stakeholders. None of these policies is appropriate for inclusion in the local negotiation stage; national expenditures must be determined by the national government and only the national government can impose an enforcement policy outside of the local process. In the local stakeholder negotiation, we focus on two policies: the severity of negotiated illegal use sanctions and the negotiated portion of water use on farms that currently lack any rights should be legalized. The water acquisition and legalization policies are used as carrots to induce farmers to accept more stringent nes and agree to install water meters. As a result, farmers are only oered the opportunity to sell rights or receive a legalized share if they agree to install a meter.
Once the national government and local stakeholders have nalized negotiations, individual farmers must respond to the policies that have been agreed upon. Farmers thus play two roles in our model: in addition to participating in the local negotiation process, we require that they respond to the outcome of these negotiations in ways that are in accordance with their individual economic self-interests. Individuals farmers in our model choose how much acreage to plant in a variety of crops, how much water to sell, and whether to install a meter. Together, these choices also determine water use (and therefore water levels), the eectiveness of a given monitoring budget, and the price at which water rights are purchased.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the details of each stage of the model. Since the model must be solved using backwards induction,
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we describe the details of the stages in reverse order, beginning with the implementation stage, moving to the local negotiation stage, and nishing with the structure setting stage.
Implementation Stage
The rst step in determining the impact of a policy vector g is determining the response of individual farmers. Individual farms within the model are indexed by i. We divide the farms into four types (small farms without water rights, small farms with water rights, medium farms and large farms) and let τ i be the type for farmer i. 
We assume that a xed quantity of water is applied to a hectare of land for a given crop. The choice about how much water to use for farming thus follows directly from the choice of land allocation.
Our model of farm optimization is necessarily schematic; we assume that farmers plant the most protable crop and abstract away other factors that might inuence crop choice. Moreover, our model is static; we choose one crop allocation for the entire period. We are thus implicitly selecting long-run crop choice and therefore do not model costs of switching crops. The model may therefore overestimate farmers willingness to switch crops, particularly 4 There are no medium or large farms in the region without water rights.
14 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5
in the short run.
Farm revenue is given by
where c indexes crops, p c is the market price, ϑ c is the yield per hectare, L ic is the hectares of land devoted to crop c , ζ c and ξ c are production function parameters, and p W is the price at which water rights are purchased from farmers, determined endogenously by a budget balance condition. The rst term is the revenue from selling crops and the second is the revenue from selling water rights.
Farm costs have three components: the cost of pumping water (C W ), meter installation costs (C M ) and expected nes for illegal use (C F ). The cost of pumping water is given by
where w d is a vector of irrigation doses per hectare for dierent crops, e is the energy cost per meter of pumping lift, and H is the pumping lift in meters.
Meter installation cost are
where m is the cost of a meter.
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Expected nes for illegal water use are given by
where ρ i is the probability of detection, φ is the coecient describing the severity of sanctions, Ψ (·) is illegal water use, and γ determines how rapidly per unit nes increase with illegal water use.,Illegal water use is a residual amount given by 
where W 0 i gives the farm's current water use. Since σ i = 0 unless a farmer has installed a meter, farms without rights today will not get a legalized share unless they install a meter.
We assume that γ > 1, implying that the per unit ne rate increases as illegal water use increases. This approach is motivated by two factors.
First, farmers' behavior must respond smoothly to changes in ne policy
16
to use standard optimization techniques, which is guaranteed by this form.
Second, farmers in the region have expressed a preference for an increasing ne structure (Lopez-Gunn, 2003, pp. 243-244) . The coecient gives the ne paid by a farmer caught using one unit of water illegally.
Of course, farmers only pay a ne if they are caught using water illegally.
Monitoring farmers is costly and the budget for enforcement is set by the national government. The cost of monitoring an individual farmer depends on the current monitoring technology.
5 As more farmers install meters on their wells, a given expenditure on monitoring leads to higher detection rates.
As a result, the probability of catching illegal users is endogenous to the farm production problem. The probability that an individual farmer is caught if using illegal water is given by
where N m is the number of farms with meters, ν m is the cost of monitoring a farm with a meter, N nm and ν nm are the equivalent for a farm without a meter, and ω m and ω nm are the probabilities that illegal use is detected if monitoring occurs for farms with and without meters, respectively.
6 The revenues from nes are returned to the taxpayers as described in subsection 5 Today, monitoring in the Guadiana basin can be done by remote sensing (which is problematic for small farms), by validating production plans, by physically visiting farms, or by monitoring electricity usage. Discussions in the region about improving monitoring are highly focused on the installation of meters rather than expanding other approaches. 6 We do not vary the allocation of monitoring eort between farms with and without meters. This policy choice would be interesting to investigate in future work.
3.3.
Farmers have diminishing marginal utility, giving an optimization problem of
for some η < 1, subject to
whereL i is the total land available to the farmer. The rst constraint states that farmers cannot sell more water rights than they currently have and cannot sell any water rights unless a meter is installed. The second constraint states that a farmer cannot plant more land than he has.
The collective impact of farmers must be determined by jointly solving all the individual rst-order conditions and the budget balance condition
To do so, we compute the rst-order conditions for a representative farmer from each type.
7 The full solution to the implementation stage jointly solves 7 See the appendix for a description of the optimization technique used to address the discrete choice of whether or not to install a meter.
the farmers' rst-order conditions for each farm's choices (x i ), its detection probability (ρ i ), pumping lift (H ), and the price of water (p W ) given the policy vector (g). There is no closed-form solution to this system of nonlinear inequalities; its solution is denoted y * (g).
Three specic outcomes of the implementation stage play an important role in the two policy-setting stages. The resulting water level is given by
where H 0 is a baseline from which pump lifts are calculated and H (·) is a function relating total water use to pumping depth. Moreover, the total prot of each group of farmers is given by
where t indexes the four farm types. Finally, total ne revenues are
Local Bargaining Stage
Today, water policy decisions in the Guadiana Basin are being made through a stakeholder negotiation process. In our model, this process is responsible for setting two components of g: the negotiated ne (b φ ) and the negotiated legalized share (b λ ). Even in the negotiated solution, the remaining two components of g are set by the national government. The bargained policy vector g N is thus given by
Based on our review of the policy discussions, we identify ve major stakeholder groups: environmentalists, and four types of farmers, distinguished by size and water rights. Each of the groups is represented at the local bargaining table by a single player. These players are indexed by j. For the four farm groups, j = t and the player's utility functions is given by
δ j (13) where δ j is the level of risk aversion for the stakeholder group representing that farm type. The environmental stakeholder group is represented by a player with the utility function
The outcome of the local stakeholder negotiated process is highly inuenced by the stakeholders beliefs about what they believe will happen if they fail to reach agreement, i.e. by the vector g 0 . We assume that national government makes a three-pronged threat to the local stakeholders: refusing to 20 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5 legalize any water use, imposing a penalty for illegal use, and using all its allocated funds for monitoring. This implies that
The bargaining process is modeled using the bargaining solution developed
by Nash (1950) extended to multiple players (Lensberg, 1988) . In our setting, the Nash bargaining solution is given by
where j indexes the stakeholder groups. The solution to this problem is found using numerical techniques and is given b * (z). Similarly, we call the resulting negotiated policy g * N (z).
Structure Setting Stage
We assume that the national government seeks to balance three objectives:
(1) maximizing total farm prots, (2) improving water levels, and (3) minimizing government expenditures. Total farm prots are
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This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5 and the total government expenditure is
This yields a government objective function of:
where α e gives the marginal value the government places on water level improvements and α t is a coecient governing the deadweight loss of taxation.
Specically, α e is the government's marginal willingness to trade reductions in annual farming prots for increases in water levels, measured in C = /m . This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5 section 4.4 were generated by selecting the point in this grid that yielded the highest value of Ω rather than the optimizing over the full model. The results should therefore be interpreted as providing a rough estimate of the policy choice that would be selected by the government.
Results
We use the numerical model developed in Section 3 to produce four types of results. First, we compute the land use choices that would maximize an equally weighted utilitarian social welfare function by allowing a benevolent dictator to directly select land use for each farm type. Since land use choices implicitly determine water use, this corresponds to allowing the benevolent dictator to set water use. We compute these estimates for several dierent marginal values of water level improvements. These computations provide an estimate of the ecient level of water use. Second, we explore the prospects for improving water levels using enforcement policy alone. Third, we use the bargaining model to assess whether the carrot-stick framework described in Section 3.1 can induce signicant improvements in water levels. Finally, we combine the full three-stage model to address the national government's choices in the structure setting stage.
Ecient Water Levels
The two panels in Figure 1 illustrate the impact of eliminating both the pumping and environmental externalities related to water use. The size of the environmental externality is dependent on the monetary value of the wetlands. We have considered a range of possible monetary values for the wetlands from 0 to 100 million C = per meter. Each point in the diagrams represents the internalization of both externalities for a specic value placed on the wetlands. The points are found by setting all the policy instruments and water sales to zero and solving
for various values of α e .
When α e = 0, the impact on the wetlands has no cost to society and the only externality is the pumping cost externality. This calculation corresponds to maximizing farm prots and thus illustrates the impact of eliminating the pumping cost externality alone. Elimination of the pumping cost externality would reduce pumping lifts by approximately 30m and increase farm prots by just over 8 million C = per year, an increase of just under 3%. As the value on the wetlands increases, the monetary size of the damages imposed by the environmental externality increases. At the extreme right, the marginal value of environmental water level improvements is set at a net present value of 100 million euros of farm prots per meter of water level improvement
24
Enforcement Policy Alone
Since individual farmers will always have an incentive to free-ride, the rstbest outcomes in Figure 1 are unattainable. Some enforcement mechanism must be used to induce farmers to reduce water levels. Figure 2 26 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5 water levels at current depths using enforcement policy alone.
The results suggest that it would be possible to reduce water use through enforcement policy alone. Yet, this approach will disproportionally impact small farmers without rights. From an implementation perspective, this is potentially problematic in that it is likely to give rise to political opposition.
Indeed, such political opposition has been at the heart of the failures of government eorts to address the Guadiana problems in the past.
Bargaining Solution
In this subsection, we focus on the second stage of the model, taking outcomes of the rst stage as given. First, we describe the bargaining outcome for a given default policy in detail. We then vary the level of the default ne coecient (z φ ) and assess how this inuences the bargaining. In this section, we freeze the monitoring and acquisition budgets at net present values of 100 million and 900 million C = , respectively. These numbers were chosen to be representative of current plans to spend over 1 billion C = with the vast majority targeted for a water rights acquisition plan.
We use a default ne coecient of 100 C = for the base simulations. Bargaining against this default, stakeholders agree upon a ne coecient of Moreover, the resulting water levels are nearly 70 m higher than the projected 28 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5 To assess the sensitivity of this result with respect to z φ , we solved the local negotiation stage under a variety of default ne specications. Figure   3 shows the impact of these ne scenarios. As expected, the nal water This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5
As in our base case example, local stakeholders choose a very stringent ne policy in each of these solutions. Through the negotiation, farmers agree to impose upon themselves enforcement regimes that have been seen as infeasible in the region thus far. They do this because the incentives oered by the national government in the form of legalized water rights and water right purchases outweigh the costs of having their water use eectively regulated.
It is critical to the success of the policy that farmers are indeed willing to impose a larger ne coecient through negotiation than the national government threatens.
To understand this result, recall that the objective in the Nash bargaining model is to maximize the product of players' gains relative to the default over the set of Pareto improvements on the default. The maximum will clearly occur at a point where all players experience a gain (assuming such a point exists). Therefore, a bargaining solution requires increased prots for every farm group and lower water use to increase the payo of environmentalists.
The only way to increase the payo of environmentalists is to ensure that water levels are higher in the bargained solution than in the default. The only way to substantially improve the payo of farmers without rights is to oer them a legalized share. Yet, doing so increases their incentive to use water since these farmers now pay nes on a smaller portion of their use.
Unless the stakeholders can generate enough water use savings from farms with rights, they must increase enforcement to consider a positive legalized share in the solution.
The acquisition process increases the payos of farmers by oering them payments for a portion of their water rights. In principle, this lowers water use by inducing farmers to switch production from high water use crops to low water use crops. However, unless there is eective enforcement, farmers may sell their water rights but continue to use most of the water they sold.
Their legal use will go down, but illegal use will increase leaving little change in overall use. Therefore, without eective enforcement, there may not be funds to purchase enough rights to generate signicant decreases in water use.
Fortunately, the model predicts that the incentives oered are sucient to induce farmers to accept more stringent enforcement than the default policy.
10 There are two important drivers of this result. First, the monitoring cost saving achieved by a combination of meter installation and high nes allow a large nancial transfer to farmers with rights in the form of water right purchases. Second, the water savings from the acquisition allow granting small farms considerable rights to use water while still reducing overall water use. As a result, all parties gain relative to the default. However, it is important to realize that at the currently announced budgets, signicant water levels improvements will not occur unless the central government can credibly threaten to impose a default ne unilaterally should stakeholders fail to reach agreement.
10 Note that this is a general result of the model. For any default enforcement policy, the stakeholders will agree to a more stringent policy in the negotiated solution.
Structure Setting
Our nal set of results illustrates how the government might set policies in the structure setting stage. As discussed in subsection 3.3, it is not feasible to optimize Eq. 18 using the numerical simulation model. Instead, we solved the local bargaining model for various values of z.
11 We then computed the value of Ω (z) assuming various values for α e (the marginal value of water level improvements) and α t (a parameter describing how quickly the deadweight loss of taxation increases). Finally, we selected the point in our grid of z values that yielded the highest value of Ω. Regardless of the value of α e or α t , the highest values of Ω were always associated with the lowest non-zero value of z M included in our policy grid. This result is not surprising; it is consistent with the general observation that the most cost eective monitoring regimes set extremely high nes and engage in very little monitoring. It is important to note, however, that the policies in which z M = 0 were never associated with the highest value of Ω. 
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When α e = 0, the national government cares only about farming prot and government expenditures. When α e = 75 at the extreme right, the national 11 Our policy grid analysis had two steps. First, we varied z φ from 10 to 100, total expenditure (z M + z A ) from 0.7 to 1.5 billion C = , and the share spent on acquisition from 0.8 to 0.94. Based on the results in this hypercube, we then analyzed a grid of policies in which we froze z M at 1.25 million C = per year (roughly 43 million in NPV) and varied z φ from 0 to 100 C = and z A from 0.5 to 1.5 billion C = . Finally, we included the outcome of continued common property access to groundwater in our set of options available to the government. 12 In all cases, z M was set equal to 2 million C = per year, which corresponds to a net present value of 42 million C = .
32 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics.
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5 government is willing to spend 75 million C = in net present value per meter of water level improvement. In the diagram, we set the value of α t at 0.1.
Increasing or decreasing the value of α t has the expected impact (increases will lead to smaller expenditures and higher depths while decreases lead to larger expenditures and smaller depths.
When the environmental value of water level improvements is low, the government will spend very little money and not threaten nes. The specic budget of 500 million C = identied in the diagram for the very lowest values of α e was the smallest budget in our grid. The government might well reduce the budget below this amount, but it will choose some action over inaction due to the pumping cost externality. This is apparent because the identied policy was chosen over doing nothing.
As the environmental value of water level improvements increases, both acquisition budgets and default ne coecients increase. Figure 5 graphs the 33 This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics.
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5 At the extreme left of the plot, the devolution process described in this paper will reduce water levels more than the rst-best, despite the cost of enforcement. This result is driven by the presence of an environmental stakeholder insisting on water level improvements in the local negotiation. Although granting power to the local process means that water use may be cut too much, this result is still preferred by the national government to continuing to allow unrestricted common property access to the groundwater. As the weight on water level improvements increases, the corresponding depths fall. A marginal value of roughly 45 million euros per meter of water level improvements would lead the government to adopt a policy that could be expected to induce water level stabilization.
Concluding Remarks
The numerical simulations in this paper generate several conclusions. First, our analysis of enforcement policy conrms that it is unlikely that enforcement policy alone can successfully solve the Guadiana problem. Simulations suggest that even with extremely high penalties for those caught using illegal water, the government would still be required to spend a prohibitively large sum on monitoring in order to stabilize water levels at the current levels. Moreover, this policy would place all of the burden of water reduction on farms that have no legal rights. These farms are predominantly small, family-owned operations and policy-makers are reluctant to destroy their protability. Moreover, there is no evidence that the national government has the political will to unilaterally impose an unpopular enforcement policy over the strong objections of those within the region.
Successful water use reduction requires coupling enforcement policy with a water rights reorganization program. If farmers agree to install meters and accept higher nes, the cost of an eective enforcement regime can be substantially reduced. Two possible incentives to promote meter installation are the opportunity to sell water rights and a partial legalization of current use.
Our simulations indicate that if the national government combines sucient 35
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funding for these incentives with suciently strong threats if agreement is not reached, then a local stakeholder bargaining process can stabilize water levels or even reverse the current declining trend in water levels. For instance, using a total budget of 1 billion C = , the national government would be required to use a ne coecient of well over 300 C = to stabilize water levels if it used enforcement policy alone. In contrast, by threatening a ne coecient of merely 50 C = , the government can induce a bargaining solution that stabilizes water levels for the same overall budget. The incentives are sucient to induce farmers to install meters and to accept increased nes.
As a result, substantial monitoring savings are achieved. The savings can then be used to fund the incentive programs.
Many of the basic features of the model analyzed in this paper, including the conict between agricultural and environmental uses and the problem of enforcement, are common to many environmental problems. Increasingly, devolution is being adopted as the policy of choice for addressing many such conicts. Our analysis highlights the important connections between choices about the structure of devolution and the ultimate bargaining outcomes.
In the Guadiana example, decisions made at the national level determine whether the local stakeholder process can be eective. If the national government fails to establish a strong credible threat, the local bargaining will produce minimal gains in water levels, if any. In contrast, with appropriate incentives, the local stakeholders can achieve substantial improvements in water levels. Moreover, these results demonstrate that by oering incentives,
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times. To do so, all lump sum payments in the model are converted into annualized values. Conversions are made using a real interest rate of 5%.
The Bromley et al paper predicts the level of groundwater 30 years from today. We approximate the time path of decline with a linear model and calculate implied pumping costs for each year. We then calculate a constant annual pumping cost that generates an equivalent net present value cost.
Farmers make their (constant) annual decisions on the basis of this cost. In reality, water levels would decline more rapidly in early years and then slowly level out. The linear choice is simpler and also osets the consequences of failing to vary water extractions over time.
The full model developed in Section 4.3 can only be solved using numerical solution techniques. The numerical analysis uses Matlab's NewtonRaphson based optimization algorithms. As noted in Section 3.2, the solution to the implementation stage is the joint solution to all farmers' Kuhn-Tucker conditions. These conditions form a system of nonlinear inequalities, which causes two numerical diculties. First, the system is dicult to solve.
13 Second, the solution to the inner system is inherently non-smooth at the boundaries of the constraint surface. As a policy instrument changes slightly, the equilibrium may move from a region where one of the inner inequalities is binding to one where it is not. This can create a kinked or discontinuous response, which is problematic for numerical optimization methods.
Both problems are addressed by converting the inner constrained problem into a nearly equivalent unconstrained problem using penalty functions.
For example, instead of explicitly preventing farmers from exceeding their current farm size, a large penalty is subtracted from the payo if farmers violate their land use constraint. The penalty function approach is frequently used in the operations research literature (Pinar, 1996; Ç. Pinar and Zenios, 1994) . Several other features of the basic model create non-smooth responses.
Each of these are addressed by approximating the non-smooth functions with smoothed ones.
A.2 Data description
The main crops in the region are vineyards, cereals, horticultural products (primarily melons, garlic, and onions), and corn. Small farms grow almost 13 There is a substantial literature on the diculty of nding numerical solutions for complex Nash equilibrium games of this form. See Krawczyk (2005) ; Krawczyk and Uryasev (2000) for a review of past approaches to the problem and a numerical solution technique. Corn is a particularly water intensive crop grown exclusively on large farms.
Horticultural products are considered socially desirable as they promote employment in the region. However, they are also relatively water intensive. Table 2 shows the average net revenue and water requirements for each of these crops.
Observed farming patterns are drawn from Llamas and Martinez-Santos (2005) , Confederacion Hydrograca del Guadiana (2007), and Llamas et al. (2006) . Farm production functions are calibrated using positive mathematical programming (Howitt, 1995) . Bromley et al. (1996 Bromley et al. ( , 2001 ) construct a hydrological model of the Guadiana basin and project water levels under various water use levels. They provide several data points, from which we construct an approximate relationship between water use and groundwater levels ( Figure 6 ). Continuation of current water use (approx 675 Mm 3 ) will result in a substantial drop in water levels. Stabilizing levels requires substantial cutbacks. Stabilization is marked on the gure. There are several model parameters for which information is limited or imprecise, including illegal water use and monitoring costs. However, policy discussion is currently proceeding with information similar to that used here.
We combined information from a variety of sources to parametrize our model. Availability of information on water use in the basin is limited. This appendix describes our assumptions and our eorts to reconcile information across sources.
Estimates of the total number of farms in the region varied from 20,000
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This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Environment and Resource Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-011-9507-5 Note: Total number of farms with rights = 7,000 to approximately 33,000 farms. Our analysis assumes that there are 25,000
farms. According to PEAG, there are approximately 7,000 exploitations or legally irrigated farms in the region. Of these, 48% are between 0 and 10ha, 32% are between 10 and 20ha, 14% are between 20 and 50 ha, and 6% between 50 and 250 ha. We combined these farms into three size categories as shown in the table below. The total irrigated acreage derived from these calculations is very close to the total legal irrigated acreage reported in Llamas and Martinez-Santos (2005) .
The remaining farms in the region are assumed to have no water rights.
Subtracting the 7,000 legal farms from 25,000 total farms leaves us with 18,000 farms without legal water rights. We assumed these farms are all small farms with the same representative size as small legal farms. This According to SIAR estimates (Llamas and Martinez-Santos, 2005) , the legal irrigated surface is distributed across crop types as shown in table 2.
According to previous studies on the production system of the basin, we distinguish three main production regimes: small farms producing vineyards and horticultural products, medium farms producing vineyards, horticultural products and winter cereals, and large farms producing winter cereals and maize.
Because maize is grown only by large farms, all 9,000 ha of maize production occurs on large farms. This implies that approximately 14% of the 63,000 ha irrigated by large farms is devoted to maize production. We therefore assume that 14% of the acreage on a representative large farm (or 21 ha) is devoted to growing maize. The remaining 86% (129 ha) is devoted to winter cereals.
All together, the large farms devote approximately 54,000 ha to the production of cereals. This implies that the remaining 8,000 ha of cereals must be produced by medium farms. This accounts for approximately 24% of the total medium farm acreage. According to Tarjuelo (2007) , about 30% of the irrigated land of a medium farm is devoted to vineyards. For an individual medium farm, this implies that approximately 10.5 ha are devoted to vineyards. Therefore, the irrigated surface that medium farms devote to vineyards is about 10,290 ha. Finally, the remaining 46% (16,010 ha) of medium farm land is devoted to horticultural crop production.
